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Abstract
Recently, the term ‘hybrid warfare’ has been applied to a set of levers by which some 
actors in international relations attempt to achieve their foreign policy objectives. 
One of the levers Russia employs in their use of hybrid warfare is to exploit ethnic 
cleavages in targeted societies. In former Soviet Republics, Russian uses propaganda 
to reach out to ethnic Russians populations (or Russian speakers) in those countries. 
In other countries, Russia cynically exploits ethnic cleavages simply to cause problems 
in targeted countries, such as Arab immigrants in western Europe or Catalonians in 
Spain. This paper explores the nature of Russia’s attempts to exploit ethnic cleavages 
and how western government should address them.
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Introduction
Recent debate within defence circles has been intense as western countries 
attempt to come to terms with the evolution of warfare (Hoffman, 2009). The 
North Atlantic Council meeting at Wales declared that ‘We will ensure that 
NATO is able to effectively address the specific challenges posed by hybrid warfare 
1  Članak je primljen u Uredništvo 19. travnja 2019. i prihvaćen za objavu 16. ožujka 2020.
(The article was received by the Editorial Board on April 19, 2019 and accepted for   publication 
on March 16, 2020.)
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threats, where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian 
measures are employed in a highly integrated design’ (NATO, 2015). 
According to military theorist Frank Hoffman, ‘Hybrid threats incorporate a 
full range of modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular 
tactics and formations, terrorist acts that include indiscriminate violence and 
coercion, and criminal disorder’ (Hoffman, 2009).2 NATO defines hybrid 
threats as ‘those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously 
employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of 
their objectives’ (Miklaucic, 2011). The synergy of multiple techniques is a 
large part of what makes hybrid threats so difficult to defeat.
Exacerbating ethnic conflict is one of the key threat techniques the Russians 
have employed since 2014. The Russian government has played upon 
the fears of ethnic Russians (and Russian-speakers) in the Baltic States. In 
Ukraine, Russia has mobilised ethnic Russians with great success, getting 
tens of thousands of people to support the Kremlin’s goals. This was not 
an entirely organic conflict. It was, at least in part, the result of Russian 
governmental manipulation. As German political scientist Andreas Umland 
has observed of the Glazyev tapes, ‘Russia actively fanned the flames of pre-
existing ethnic, cultural and political tensions in the region’ of southern and 
eastern Ukraine (Umland, 2016).
Exploiting Ethnicity 
Exploiting ethnic cleavages in western societies is an ideal hybrid 
technique for several reasons. First, the western liberal tradition urges 
states to downplay rather than accentuate ethnic differences among their 
2  In 2007, Hoffman used this definition: “Hybrid wars can be conducted by both states and 
a variety of non-state actors. Hybrid wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, 
including convention capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including 
indiscriminate violence and coercion and criminal disorder.  These multimodal activities can 
be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and 
tactically directed and coordinated with the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects.” 
Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, (Arlington, Virginia: 
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 14.
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populations. Second, the fairness or justice of a government’s policy vis-à-
vis an ethnic minority, in the end, is not determined by the government, 
but by the targeted population. Thus, a western liberal state may feel it is 
treating an ethnic minority population justly, but that minority population 
may nevertheless feel badly abused by the government, and therefore that 
population might be receptive to Russian propaganda highlighting the 
perceived injustice. Finally, unlike policy debates, ethnic differences may be 
intensely felt and are not susceptible to compromise. A leftist may debate 
a rightist on economic policy and may be convinced by the argument and 
change his mind. If an ethnic minority member is convinced that the majority 
ethnicity hates him simply because of his ethnicity, the minority member 
cannot change to accommodate the majority’s concerns, even if he wanted to 
do so. An ethnic conflict is an intransigent one.
Russia does not target only ethnic Russian populations, but exploits ethnic 
cleavages in targeted countries whenever it is useful to Russian policy. In 
Ukraine, Russian secret services and propaganda apparatus skilfully used 
ethnic Russians living in that country. Paramilitary groups were formed 
and mobilized and the general population incited by Russia propaganda to 
resist the Kyiv government. In countries with no Russian population, proxy 
populations have been used. In the Balkans, Russia, citing historical ties, has 
sought out ethnic Serbs for ethnic appeals. In Georgia, Abkhaz and South 
Ossetian minorities were exploited to achieve Russian objectives. Cynics 
might say that Russia is not really concerned about a minority population’s 
human rights; they are just exploiting ethnic cleavages to create chaos. A 
case in point would be the Catalan secession episode. Spanish investigators 
found that Russia used Spanish-speaking people and bots (i.e. automated 
social media accounts) to incite Catalan secessionists and, at the same time, 
to point out to Madrid how Catalan independence would hurt the Spanish 
economy (Alandete, 2017; Lesaca, 2017). The Kremlin, for its part, takes a 
very different view of ethnic secessionists inside the Russian Federation. The 
experience of Grozny from 2000 can illustrate the point. Let us examine the 
history of Russian thinking about ethnicity and warfare.
Western writers refer to the new form of warfare employed by Russia (and 
others) as ‘hybrid warfare.’ To understand the trajectory of the term ‘hybrid 
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warfare,’ however, we must understand what roots it had in the Russian 
mind. While there has been much Russian ink spilled to explain how war has 
recently evolve and to plot a Russian path for the future of fighting, Russians 
until recently did not use the word “hybrid warfare.” In 2010, two Russian 
military thinkers, Colonel Sergei Chekinov and Lieutenant General Sergei 
Bogdanov of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies of the General 
Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, posited the asymmetrical 
ways in which the Russian armed forces could protect the Russian Federation 
(Chekinov and Bogdanov, 2010). In this article, they wrote of ‘remote non-
contact confrontation’3 and ‘non-contact forms of troops (forces) and their 
mode of action.’4 Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff of the 
Russian Armed Forces in a 2013 article wrote of ‘distant non-contact effects’ 
(Gerasimov, 2013). These ideas have been translated into English using the 
terms ‘non-linear warfare’ and ‘hybrid warfare’ (McDermott, 2014). 
This translation does not completely describe what the Russian thinkers 
have in mind. Gerasimov suggests ‘taking advantage of the protest potential 
of the population.’5 Partisan warfare advocate Anatoly Zaitsev demonstrates 
that this is not just theoretical hypothesizing when he applauds the use 
of ‘the people’s militia in the south-eastern Ukraine’ (Zaitsev, 2014). Most 
significantly, Russian President Vladimir Putin describes the character of 
modern military conflicts as being ‘implemented with the extensive use of 
the protest potential of the population, and special operations forces’ (Putin, 
2014). This is clearly a maturing concept that is beyond just a relaxing of the 
Soviet linear approaches to operations. Russian strategic thinking centres in 
some ways on the population in the targeted area and whipping up popular 
discontent.
So, what do we make of this Russian thought? How should this effect policy? 
3  In Russian: “дистанционного (неконтактного) противоборства” and “неконтактные 
формы применения войск (сил) и способы их действий” (Chekinov and Bogdanov, 2010).
4  In Russian: “неконтактные формы применения войск (сил) и способы их действий” 
(Chekinov and Bogdanov, 2010).
5  In Russian: “Pеализуемых с задействованием протестного потенциала населения” 
(Gerasimov, 2013).
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The success of hybrid warfare or the Russian ‘non-contact confrontation,’ 
depends heavily on acceptance by and support from the local population in 
the area of operations. This in turn is heavily dependent on the perceived 
legitimacy of the political goals and the forces attempting to realise them. 
Legitimacy has been defined as ‘the conceded right to exercise authority over 
and on behalf of a population’ (Cable, 1998). Further, legitimacy consists 
of two types: existential and functional legitimacy. Existential legitimacy 
derives from how a group got power, while functional legitimacy is ‘the 
perceived ability to understand the hopes, fears, needs and aspirations of a 
population or of a major constituency of that population. The emphasis here 
is upon perceptions, local perceptions of legitimacy. The population that a 
government seeks to rule, not by the government itself, defines legitimacy. 
The people of Donetsk and Lugansk, not by governments in Kyiv and 
Moscow, determine the legitimacy of Ukrainian governmental actions in 
eastern Ukraine. Ukrainians of Russian extraction may view current events 
through the experience of their Russian parents and grandparents during 
World War II. Some Ukrainians of Russian extraction emphasized the ethnic 
component of Maidan Revolution (i.e. seeing the conflict as being between 
Russians and Ukrainians). In Latvia and Estonia, how ethnic Latvians and 
Estonians view public policy may be quite different from the way ethnic 
Russians in those countries view the same policy. Russian propaganda can 
be differentiated by virtue of language.  For example, propaganda oriented 
towards Serbs is broadcast in Serbian while propaganda intended to incite 
Arab migrants is broadcast in Arabic.
This highlights the importance of narrative as an input to how people view 
politics and how politics shapes their reactions. In this there are two very 
different types of narratives. First is the organic narrative, in that it originates 
with the people on the ground themselves. The other type is the sponsored 
narrative, one that originates outside the objective area, and is exported to 
the population for political purposes. One example of this is the narrative 
that the Euromaidan protest. Ukrainians see themselves as establishing a 
degree of independence from Moscow.  The Kremlin portrays western 
Ukrainians as ‘fascists’ (BBC, 2014; Kozlowska, 2014). Russian military 
thinker Anatoly Zaitzev, in his article ‘Partisan Methods,’ cites the anti-
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Soviet Ukrainian Insurgent Army (“UPA” in Ukrainian), which fought the 
Red Army as well as the Nazis during World War II (Zaitsev, 2014). This fits 
the Kremlin narrative that opponents of President Yanukovich as fascists. 
Ironies abound. Political scientists Agnia Grigas and Marcel van Herpen 
write, “What present-day Russia calls ‘anti-fascism’ is rather the expression 
of a jingoist, nationalist mood, which in fact comes close, very close indeed, 
to a modern variant of fascism itself” (Grigas and Herpen, 2014).
From the perspective of policy, the issues of self-perception of legitimacy 
and the sponsored narrative are helpful tools in predicting potential trouble 
spots. Using these tools, policy makers wishing to anticipate where the next 
hybrid threat may break out can look for these two indicators: ethnicity and 
the employment of a sponsored narrative.  For example, Crimea, in 2001, was 
58.5% ethnic Russian. The collapse of the Yanukovich regime was a trigger 
for non-Russian Ukrainians in Crimea to declare their support for the new 
regime in Kyiv (Fisher, 2014).6 Ethnic Russians in Crimea responded (Amos, 
2014). This may have been organic or sponsored by Moscow (Allison, 2014; 
Lavrov, 2015). Political scientist Nikolay Mitrokhin argued that the Donbass 
uprising was led, at least in part, by FSB and GRU operatives (Mitrokhin, 
2015).  Within days ethnic Russians were calling for a referendum on Crimean 
independence (Smith and Stromova, 2014), and ‘little green men,’ commonly 
believed, but never officially acknowledged, to be members of the Russian 
military, appeared in Crimea by February 28, 2014 (Ramirez, 2014).
The same template played out in eastern Ukraine. Oblasts with significant 
ethnic (or linguistic) Russian populations soon became scenes of ethnic 
violence and separatist or secessionist movements. Donetsk oblast, for 
example, at the most recent Ukrainian census was 38.2% ethnic Russian. 
Luhansk oblast was 39% ethnic Russian but 68.8% Russian-speaking (State 
Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2001). It is not surprising that these two 
soon became the scenes of ethnic violence and separatist action, and, most 
importantly, the theatre of operations of ‘little green men’ or ‘polite men,’ 
6  At a rally in Simferopol on 23 February 2014, 5,000-15,000 people declared loyalty to the 
new regime in Kyiv, for the dissolution of the current Crimean parliament, and prosecution 
of separatist leaders in Crimea (Radio Svoboda, 2014).
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commonly believed to be Russian soldiers intervening for the benefit of 
the local Russian populations (Frizell, 2014). The Russian policy of offering 
Russian passports to all ethnic Russians in former Soviet republics who want 
them has given Russia the entrée it needs for intervention ‘to protect their 
compatriots’ from perceived harassment (Grigas, 2014).
The model has limits, however. For example, Kharkiv oblast has a population 
that is 25.6% ethnic Russian (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2001), 
yet no long-lasting ethnic violence broke out there. It is possible that other 
factors explain this lack of hybrid war breaking out. Perhaps there is a ‘take-
off’ level of ethnicity required for ethnic strife to erupt. Perhaps the local 
conditions were not sufficiently tense. Perhaps there were no adequate 
leaders of the ethnic Russian community to lead a Russian separatist 
movement in Kharkiv.7 Perhaps there was a shortage of Russian forces to 
support expanding operations into Kharkiv Oblast. Similar Russian attempts 
to sponsor secessionist coups in Odessa and Zaporizhzhiya also collapsed 
(Kuzio, 2017).
Russia’s plans for hybrid warfare in the future are anyone’s guess, although 
the potential theatres are not difficult to template. The Baltic States would 
seem to be possible venues, although the ethnic (and linguistic) populations 
vary considerably. Lithuania for example, has a population that is 5.8% is 
ethnic Russian and 15% Russian speakers. Latvia is 26.2% ethnic Russian 
and 34% speaks Russian. Estonia is 24.8% ethnic Russians and 30% Russian 
speaking (CIA, 2015; Grigas, 2014).
Ethnic populations at the national level are not the sole factor, or even the 
most significant factor in determining where a hybrid war might erupt. As 
the Ukrainians have learned, there are ‘micro-theatres’ in which ethnic strife 
might erupt. It was not in Ukraine overall where Russian intervention broke 
out, but in the Russian-majority Crimea and in the oblasts of Luhansk and 
Donetsk with significant Russian minorities where fighting started. In the 
7  Although, oddly, Yanukovich fled to his “stronghold” in Kharkiv when he left Kyiv in 
February 2014. This Yanukovich “stronghold” in Kharkiv did not translate into an ethnic 
Russian stronghold in the fighting that followed. The centre of gravity of ethnic Russians in 
Ukraine proved to lie further south and east in Donetsk and Lugansk.
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Baltic States, some areas have Russian or Russophone majorities or significant 
Russian minorities. In Tallinn, Estonia, for example, 37% of the population 
is ethnic Russian and 46% of the population speaks Russian. Narva, Estonia, 
is 88% ethnic Russian. In Riga, Latvia, ethnic Russians make up 40% of the 
population, while Russian-speakers total nearly 50%. In the Latvian city of 
Daugavpils, ethnic Russians are nearly 54% of the population, while Russian-
speakers make up 79%.  Vilnius, Lithuania, is 12% ethnic Russian, while 
nearly 27% speak Russian. In the city of Klaipeda, Lithuania, ethnic Russians 
make up nearly 20% of the population, while Russian-speakers total 28% 
(Grigas, 2014). The key point is that, in order for an ethnically based problem 
to erupt, a countrywide Russian majority is not necessary. A local majority 
may suffice to get an ethnic conflict started, unleashing the dynamics of 
inter-ethnic conflict.
Russia seeks to exacerbate ethnic tension between groups that include 
no Russians at all. For example, Russia placed an embargo on Moldovan 
exports of fruit and wine, but exempted fruit and wine from the ethnic 
Gagauz region of Moldova. In a more provocative example, two ethnic Poles 
in the Ukrainian province of Zakarpatia firebombed a Hungarian cultural 
centre in Uzhhorod. Later investigation, revealed the men’s ties to the 
Polish far-right organization Falanga, whose leader travelled to the Donetsk 
People’s Republic and some of whose members have gone to Donbass to 
fight alongside the Russian separatists (Górzynski, 2018). Do Russians really 
want to destroy a Hungarian cultural centre in a remote Ukrainian province? 
Probably not, especially since Hungarian President Oban may be Putin’s 
closest friend in the European Union. More likely, the Kremlin mere wished 
to stir up ethnic strife between Poles, Hungarians and Ukrainians under 
the zero-sum game assumption that anything bad for the West is good for 
Russia.
A similar tale is brewing in the western Balkans. The Republika Srpska (RS), the 
Serbian half of the Bosnian Federation, declared January 9 its national holiday. 
January 9 is both the date on which the RS declared its independence from 
Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1992, and the Feast of Saint Stephen, the republic’s 
patron saint. The Bosnia Constitutional Court declared the selection of this 
discriminatory and thus unconstitutional. RS President Dodik responded 
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by calling for a referendum on independence from the Bosnian Federation 
in 2018. ‘It was an arranged marriage, and it has not worked out,’ he said. 
‘Bosnia and Herzegovina is an arranged state, and we want out’ (Surk, 2018).
Russia’s involvement is more oblique. South Ossetian leader Anatoly 
Bibilov travelled to Banja Luka to celebrate the Day of the Republika Srpska 
with RS President Dodik. This was unlikely to have happened without the 
permission and support of the Russian government (Jardine, 2018). Also, the 
Russian motorcycle gang the Night Wolves will travel to the RS to celebrate 
the Day of the Republika Srpska (Radio Free Europe - Radio Liberty, 2018) 
Dodik has asked Russian to sell rifles to the RS police and requested that 
Russia train the RS special police unit. Russia has agreed (Borger, 2018). In 
September 2017, Dodik announced he was putting on hold a referendum on 
the independence of the RS (Kovacevic, 2018). Dodik later reneged, but did 
not swear off holding the election, just putting off the date when it would 
be held. Time will tell if the RS renews talk of secession from the Bosnian 
Federation, and whether Russian support is behind the move.
Russia’s ethnic politics certainly makes for strange political bedfellows. Most 
Poles remember that Russia helped carve up Poland in 1772-1795. They also 
remember the Soviet attempts to crush Polish independence in 1920 and 
the Soviet invasion of Poland in September 1939. Despite this, the leader 
of the ethnic Polish party in Lithuania, Waldemar Tomaszewski, has been 
accused of having ties to Russia (European Foundation for Human Rights, 
2012). Tomaszewski has indeed been in Moscow, although he said it was 
in a private capacity, seeking medical treatment for his son (Maciazek, 
2015). Tomaszewski has criticized the Euromaidan protests, worn a St. 
George’s ribbon in public and cooperated with Baltskii Mir, a Russian-
language magazine whose target audience is Russians in Lithuania, Latvia 
and Estonia. For their part, the Russians have emphasised that their fight 
is against fascists in Kyiv, yet they seem willing to collaborate with Polish 
fascists and anti-Semites and some Polish far-right fighters have come to 
Donbass to fight for the Russians there (Jackson, 2014). Taken together, it 
seems the Russian government are content to embrace opportunistically 
anyone who can merely cause trouble in the countries to their west.
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Proposed Solutions
Knowing that ethnically-based security problems may erupt, however, 
does not generate solutions. It is only defining the problem, and perhaps 
predicting where they may occur. This requires an interdisciplinary or 
interagency approach, in which officials from the ministry of the interior, 
for example, coordinate with and share information between intelligence 
officials, diplomats, police, and potentially the military. This is a whole-of-
government way of anticipating and hopefully pre-emptively dealing with 
hybrid threats.  A Counter Hybrid Threat strategy that deals with ethnic 
exploitation should consist of two broad planks, moderation and vigilance. 
Moderation helps prevent problem. One example is allowing ethnic 
minorities to teach school in their preferred language (Musch, 2014). The 
old Soviet Socialist way to deal with nationality was to downplay it, and 
emphasise instead class struggle (Hough and Fainsod, 1979). Today, the 
Kremlin emphasizes ethnicity and nationality and does not deal with class 
at all, at least not in the way the Bolsheviks did. When looking for exploitable 
cleavages in today’s societies, ethnolinguistic differences are readily available 
and easy to exacerbate.
The language of instruction in schools is a hot-button issue and one of the 
fault lines of ethnic conflict in the former Soviet Union (Musch, 2014). Ethnic 
Russians see maintaining Russian language in the schools as a key component 
of keeping their children ethnically rooted, passing the language on to the next 
generation and thus keeping alive Russian culture in a non-Russian land. It is 
important to remember that the legitimacy of such a policy will be determined 
by the minority population, not by the countrywide majority or the government 
imposing it. For example, allowing Russian language instruction one day per 
week in Russian-majority areas might seem like a great concession to the 
government, but may be seen as totally inadequate to the Russian minority, to 
whom Russian propaganda appeals might one day be made. 
Gaining and maintaining proficiency in the country’s majority language is a 
worthy policy goal. One Lithuanian graduate student noted that ‘due to the 
poor teaching of Lithuanian in Russian [language] schools, most graduates 
41
“Exploiting Ethnicity in Russian Hybrid Threats”
face discomfort in the universities and labour market’ (Grigas, 2014).8 Thus, 
encouraging Lithuanian language proficiency is important for two reasons. 
First, it can help unify the country. Second, it helps ethnic Russians so they 
can compete in the Lithuanian labour market.  If pushed too hard, however, 
Lithuanian language proficiency can become a wedge dividing ethnic 
Russians from their Lithuanian countrymen.
Next, the government or majority culture would do well to remember that 
ethnic division and conflict may well change over time. Ethnic Russians in 
the Baltic States who moved there in the Soviet era and late in their lives 
may never feel ‘at home’ in Latvia. One 80-year old Russian woman, who 
came to Latvia in the early 1950s and obviously now feels alienated, related 
to an interviewer: ‘We are non-citizens. They called us occupiers, but now 
they turn out [to be] occupiers themselves. This is Russia’s land’ (Krutaine 
and Mardiste, 2014) ‘Even though Latvia may give citizenship to Russian-
speaking people,’ one graduate student explains, ‘they can never be called 
Latvians because Latvia strictly differentiates between citizenship and 
nationality. My citizenship is Latvian, but my nationality can be only Russian 
or Polish.’ This distinction ‘makes Russian-speaking people feel alienated 
and not wanted in society’ (Grigas, 2014)
On the other hand, there are centripetal forces at work as well. Artem, a 
Russian-speaking doctoral student also from Riga, ‘I’m a Latvian citizen, 
and I don’t think of myself as somehow involved in Russian nationalism of 
politics. Besides, I think that Russia is rolling into the darkness these days, and 
I can’t accept on any level their contemporary aggressive national rhetoric’ 
(Grigas, 2014). One Russian-speaking Estonian schoolgirl explained, ‘I was 
born in Estonia, it is my homeland.’ Anton, a 24-year-old student in Tallinn, 
agrees. ‘I do not consider myself as a [Russian] compatriot,’ he says, ‘because 
apart from the Russian language, nothing ties me to Russia.’ Thus, there is a 
temporal aspect to this acculturation process. Older ethnic Russians are more 
8  United States faces a similar problem with Spanish and English language proficiency. 
Immigration advocates urge Spanish language instruction for immigrant children of Spanish 
heritage, but this may have the unintended consequence of stunting the development of 
English language ability necessary for these children to one day integrate fully into American 
economic and social life.
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set in their ways while younger ethnic Russians may be more willing to adopt 
their native country over (or alongside) their ethnicity. The key question is 
whether or not time is the friend of peace. If time is on the country’s side, the 
government should adopt a policy of moderation, let time do its work, and 
not needlessly antagonize a resident minority.
Vigilance represents the second plank of an interagency response to hybrid 
threats. Western governments must monitor foreign media for changes in the 
Russian propaganda narrative. If a neighbouring country unleashes a spike 
in broadcast or print media making appeals to the nationalism of the targeted 
minority, this may be quite significant. Russian news media is increasingly 
a tool of Kremlin policy (Šešelgytė, 2014). If Russian media is highlighting 
that ethnic minorities in one’s country are facing any mistreatment, it could 
signal that the Russian government is trying to see what spurring ethnic 
tension might spark. More work is needed on this area in studies of how 
Russian intelligence, Russian diplomats, and Russian media behave leading 
up to the Russian intervention in Crimea and Ukraine. 
Next, domestic intelligence services have a responsibility to help prepare the 
country. This means learning whether the foreign ‘sponsored’ narrative is 
gaining traction among domestic populations. Military counterintelligence 
must also maintain vigilance especially in regard to ethnic Russians (or 
ethnic minorities) holding public office or positions of trust. This is a sensitive 
matter, since excessive distrust of members of ethnic minorities in public 
office may well cause the alienation the strategy seeks to address and which 
the Russians seek to foster. Russian military thinkers S. G. Chekinov and 
S. A. Bogdanov, however, explicitly call for ‘intimidation, fraud, bribery of 
government and military figures, [and] the use of blackmail to persuade the 
leaders of the country’s armed forces to abandon their duties’ (Chekinov and 
Bogdanov, 2013; Berzins, 2014) As the Yanukovich regime came apart, who 
knows what pressures Ukrainian officers of Russian descent were placed 
under and which ones succumbed and switched their loyalties to Russia? In 
the middle of the Crimea Anschluss, one Ukrainian admiral announced he 
was switching sides (Polityuk and Zverev, 2017). Alexei Dressen, an ethnic 
Russian living in Estonia, was employed by the Estonian Internal Security 
Service, and was later arrested for spying for the Russians (Kuczyński, 2018).
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Targeted countries must examine their own vulnerabilities from the eyes of 
hybrid threats, not the way a government wishes to see itself. Russia may 
attempt to exploit ethnic fissures that Europeans countries might believe do 
not exist. For example, in eastern Europe, a government may believe that 
its policies towards a Roma population are enlightened and liberal, but the 
members of the Roma population may see themselves as being oppressed. 
Likewise, in western Europe, a government may believe that it is treating 
Middle Eastern migrants and refugees magnanimously, but this migrants 
and refugees may see their situation differently. Further, Russian propaganda 
will work to enflame resentments and exacerbate tensions. The messages, 
‘You are poor because they are rich’ and ‘They hate you for your ethnicity’ 
may be demagogic and irresponsible, but they are very enticing to those who 
see themselves as downtrodden. 
Finally, the military must maintain the ability to repel an armed foreign 
invasion, repress a domestic insurgency, and defeat a hybrid combination of 
both. Ukraine did not adequately fund its military in the years leading up to 
the Euromaidan protest and has paid a very steep price in blood, treasure, 
and prestige since February 2014. NATO members cannot afford to find 
themselves in the same situation; the stakes are so much higher.
Conclusion
Hybrid threats are arguably a serious menace in today’s international 
environment. The application of conventional military force, insurgency, 
criminal activity, cyber-attack, and information operations and the 
exploitation of ethnic cleavages, all in concert and in close proximity in 
time and space represents a serious threat. Russia looks for weaknesses in 
targeted countries, ones it can exploit to its advantage. Hybrid threats are by 
nature multi-vectored, and often include appeals to ethnicity. Responding to 
them calls for a comprehensive strategy which leverages multiples elements 
of national power, including law enforcement, foreign affairs, intelligence 
and counterintelligence, informational elements, as well as security agencies 
working in close coordination with each other. While the military may be part 
of the solution, countering hybrid threats is not simply a military problem 
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requiring a military solution.  In many stages, the military will not be in the 
lead.  A complete strategy must address countering hybrid threats using an 
interdisciplinary effort employing all the means at the state’s disposal.
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